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)
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CRAIG MISMASH,
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890477-CA

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

COMES NOW THE RESPONDENT/PLAINTIFF to the above entitled
action,

by

and

through

counsel

and

hearby

submits

the

Respondent's brief in this matter:
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS AND JURISDICTION
Defendant/Appellant is appealing a District Court order,
denying its Motion for Summary Judgment in a case brought by the
State

of

Utah,

Department

of

Social

Services

to

establish

paternity and collect child support from the Defendant/appellant.
Defendant/appellant makes the same argument on appeal as he made
before

the trial

court: that this paternity

suit should

be

dismissed with prejudice based upon the affirmative defense of
laches.
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant to U.C.A.
78-2a-3(2)(h).

STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL
1. Did the District Court properly deny the defendant's
Motion for Summary Judgment on the issue of laches?
2.

Should

laches ever be an available defense

in a

paternity action when the suit is brought before the child that
is the subject of the litigation reaches the age of majority?

DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS
Rules 8(c) and 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedures
are determinative of issue number one in this appeal.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The

State

of

Utah

had

great

difficulty

locating

defendant/appellant in 1972 when the subject child was born.

The

State finally located him in 1978 and promptly filed a paternity
suit

against

the

Appellant/Defendant

that

same

year.

Appellant/Defendant answered the complaint and was represented by
his attorney Matt Biljanic.

However, Appellant/Defendant refused

to comply with the court's blood test order.

Finally, Matt

Biljanic withdrew from representing appellant/defendant
he

because

was uncooperative. (R. 7). For procedural reasons, the State

was unable to obtain a default paternity judgment.
The State was unable to locate defendant/appellant until
1984,

when

paternity.

the

State

promptly

the

another

petition

for

After several attempts, the case was dismissed for

lack of personal service.
and

filed

State

defendant/appellant.

Finally, in 1987 this suit was filed

obtained

personal

service

over

the

During the period from June 1979 through August 1986, the
mother of the child in question

went off public assistance

several times and would not fully cooperate with the State of
Utah.

The State could not proceed without her cooperation.

Presently, the mother is very cooperative and wishes to finally
resolve all issues as soon as possible.
The trial court noted

that the State of Utah had made

reasonable efforts to establish paternity, but was unable to do
so

at

an

earlier

date

due

partly

to

the

actions

of

the

nonexistence

the

defendant/appellant. (R. 15)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant/appellant

failed

to

show

of

certain issues of fact that were necessary to support his claim
of

laches.

Defendant/appellant

had

certain facts to support his defense.

the

burden

of

proving

However, not only did he

fail to submit any factual evidence to support his claim, but the
evidence that was submitted unequivocally supports the State's
assertion that laches does not apply in this case.
Further, laches should never be a defense in a paternity
proceeding that is brought when the subject child is a minor
because of the inherent rights of the child and the State that
are involved in a paternity proceeding.

ARGUMENT
The District Court order should be affirmed

for the

following reasons:
POINT ONE
MATERIAL ISSUES OF PACT EXIST WHICH PREVENTED THE DISTRICT
COURT FROM RULING AS A MATTER OF LAW ON THE ISSUE OF LACHES
The record from the lower court clearly reveals that many
issues of material fact exist in this case.

The Utah Supreme

Court ruled years ago that a summary judgment movant must show
that no genuine issue as to any material fact exists.

Young v.

Felornia, 121 Utah 646, 244 P.2d 862 (1952). However, the State
provided credible evidence that it did not unreasonably delay
this matter, but that it is the defendant who has continually
delayed these proceedings (R. 7).
The State showed to the District Court that this matter
would

have

been

appellant/defendant

resolved
refused

to

in
even

1978.
cooperate

However,

the

with

own

his

attorney in addition to the District Court and the State.

(R. 7)

The State further showed that the mother did not always cooperate
with the State which further inhibited the State's ability to
pursue this matter.
Appellant/defendant clearly misrepresents the record of the
lower court by alleging in his brief "no one had ever approached
him claiming he was the father" of the subject child. (Appellant
Brief page 5). He would have this Court believe that the State
did

nothing

to

resolve

this

paternity

issue.

However,

appellant/defendant counsel admitted to the low€»r court that the
State had pursued him well before 1987 (R. 13).

Further, Appellant/defendant does not cite to the lower
court's record in support of any of his contentions on this
appeal as required
of Appeals.

by Rule 24(e) of the Rules of the Utah Court

However, it is very clear from the record that the

State did not delay unreasonably in bringing this action (R. 15).
The

trial

court

found

specifically

that

the

Appellant/defendant actually delayed this matter (R. 15). It is
a well known maxim in courts of equity that a person who causes a
delay cannot claim prejudice from such a delay.

[See In Re

Estate of Novolich, 500 P.2d 1297 at 1301 (Wa. App. 1972) and
Newton v. Hornblower, Inc., 582 P.2d 1136 at 1145 (Kan. 1978)].
It is therefore, very clear that summary judgment in favor of
appellant was not warranted.

POINT TWO
APPELLANT FAILED TO ESTABLISH FACTS NECESSARY TO SUPPORT
HIS AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE OF LACHES
Rule 8(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure specifically
states that Laches must be pleaded as an affirmative defense.
Rule 56(c) further states,
...The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions of file, together with the affidavits, if any,
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law....
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 56(c) 1953, as amended.
Inherent in both of these rules, with respect to asserting an
equitable defense, is the requirement of the moving party to
prove the facts necessary to establish, as a matter of law, the

affirmative defense of laches.

However, appellant

failed to

properly even allege the facts necessary to establish his laches
defense.
Appellant
delayed

must

first allege that the State unreasonably

initiating these proceedings and that such delay has

prejudiced appellant's position at trial.

However, appellant

failed to rely upon any discovery, affidavits, or admissible
evidence

either

establishes

or

alleges

that

the

unreasonably delayed causing prejudice to appellant.

State

Therefore,

in reality, appellants motion of summary judgment was identical
to a motion to dismiss under Rule 12 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.
However, appellant's answer to the State's complaint fails
to allege and certainly fails to establish an unreasonable delay
causing prejudice to appellant.

A party cannot merely allege

that a claim is barred by the equitable doctrine of laches, as
appellant does, and expect to prevail on an affirmative defense.
The Utah Supreme Court has ruled that bare contentions cannot
resolve issues of fact crucial to the resolution of the case.
Frisbee b. K & K Const. Co., 676 P.2d 387 at 390 (Utah 1984).
Case law is clear that a party may bring a motion to dismiss
based

upon

unreasonable

laches, but
delay

plus

only

if

the

prejudice.

pleadings

Conti

v.

clearly

Board

of

show
Civil

Service Commissioners, 461 P.2d 617 at 624 (CA 1969).
Because

appellant

failed

to

even

alleged

through

his

pleadings, discovery, affidavits, or other admissible evidence,
the District Court had no choice, but to deny his motion for

Summary Judgment.

Appellant's mere proffering of alleged facts

through his attorney is insufficient.
Further, Appellant's proffer of prejudice is irrelevant to a
laches defense.

Appellant continues to allege that he has been

prejudiced because he lost several years of visitation with the
subject.

However, the only prejudice that is relevant to a

laches claim is the kind that harms a person's position at trial.
However, appellant has not petitioned the Court for visitation.
Therefore, appellant's proffer of alleged facts is insufficient
to

establish

anything

as

a matter

of

law

and

it

is

also

irrelevant to the issue of prejudice.
At best appellant only raised more issues of fact in this
proceeding.

However, it is very clear that summary judgment is

not used to determine facts, but only to ascertain whether there
are any material issues of fact in dispute. Hill ex rel. Fogel v.
Grand

Cent.,

Inc.,

25

Utah

2d

121,

477

P.2d

150

(1970).

Moreover, appellant cannot cite any authority to support his
position.
Appellant/defendant

only

cites

two

neither of which support his position.
commercial matters.

cases

in

his

brief,

One case deals with

The other case, Borland v. Chandler, only

states that laches may apply to a case at law, but the court
refused to apply laches to the paternity proceeding before the
court.

Borland v. Chandler, 733 P.2d 144 at 146 (Utah 1987).

However, all cases on the subject hold that the party asserting
laches must show that a party unreasonably delayed and that such
delay will prejudice another party's case at trial.

Appellant failed to establish or even allege unreasonable
delay

or

prejudice,

therefore,

the

trial

court's

ruling

is

proper.

POINT THREE
THERE ARE MANY LEGAL AND EQUITABLE REASONS WHY LACHES SHOULD
NEVER BE AN AVAILABLE DEFENSE IN A PATERNITY PROCEEDING THAT
IS BROUGHT WHEN THE SUBJECT CHILD IS A MINOR
Respondent

is unaware, after extensive research, of any

cases in the United States where a paternity action was barred or
dismissed based upon the equitable doctrine of laches.

Most

jurisdictions realize that while laches may apply generally to
actions at law or equity, important legal and equitable reasons
should prevent its application in certain clear categories of
cases.
The first and most important reason why laches should never
be a defense in a paternity proceeding brought while the child is
a minor is that the interest of the child and society are harmed.
If laches is a successful defense a child could be deprived of
its ability to obtain past, present, and future* child support.
Society is in turn harmed because it is the policy of this State
to require that every father support his children (see generally
U.C.A. 78-45-3).
The state and the mother are, in the vast majority of cases,
the only possible persons who will ever pursue a putative father
to gain support for the child.

Further, Utah Courts have on

several occasions ruled that child support is a right owed to the
child, and not the custodial parent. Race v. Race, 740 P. 2d 253

at 256 (Utah 1987).

Therefore, equity should preclude a ruling

where actions of the state or the mother prejudice the rights of
child.
Many

states have specifically

ruled

that

laches is not

available in a paternity proceeding because of the interests of
the child that are involved.

A Washington court ruled that

laches did not bar a paternity action first commenced 13 years
after the birth of the subject child. Nettles v. Beckley, 648
P.2d 508 at 510 (Wash. App. 1982).

The court held:

The right of an illegitimate child to assert a claim for
parental support is too fundamental to permit its forfeiture
by its mother's failure to timely institute a paternity
suit. (Emphasis added)

Id. at 510.

Washington is one example among many states that

will not allow laches to bar paternity suit.
no less protective of its children.

Utah is certainly

Therefore, laches should not

be available in a paternity proceeding in Utah.
Second, many states have refused to allow a laches defense
to

a

statutory

proceeding

limitations has run.
is a defense

before

the

applicable

statute of

The logic behind this view is that laches

that was previously

only applicable

to equity

proceedings where statutes of limitations do not exist.

However,

in cases at law, such as this paternity proceeding, specified
statutory limits exist to protect a party against delay.
Since courts of equity and law have merged, an incongruity
exists in certain areas as is the case of laches and the statute
of limitations.

Both purport to prevent stale claims.

However,

because many courts have ruled that a party has a right to rely
upon the time period prescribed by law, many jurisdictions have
simply ruled that laches only applies to a proceeding that may be
somehow brought after the applicable statute of

limitations has

run.
In a divorce proceeding to collect past due child support a
Washington

court

ruled,

"absent

unusual

circumstances,

the

doctrine of laches should not be invoked to bar an action short
of the applicable statue of limitation."
P.2d 1019 at 1023 (Wash. App. 1988).

Hunter v. Hunter, 758

See generally 30A C.J.S.

Section 131.
Further, even states that have not fully merged equitable
and

legal

defenses

will

apply

the

applicable

statute

of

limitations by analogy when determining the issue of delay in a
laches defense.

See

Rise v., Steckel, 652 P.2d 364 at 370 (Or.

App. 1982).
In Utah, as in most states, the statute of limitations for
bringing a paternity suit is tolled while the subject child is a
minor.

The only applicable statute that governs limitations in a

paternity proceeding is U.C.A. 78-45-3 which limits a putative
father's liability for past support to four years preceding the
filing of the complaint.

Although this statute does not affect

when a suit may be brought, it does protect a putative father
from having a judgment entered against him for 18 years of past
support.
While Utah does not have a specific provision dictating when
a paternity proceeding must be commenced, the Utah Supreme Court

ruled that whatever period may apply shall be tolled while the
child is a minor.
(Utah 1981).

Szarak v. Sandolval# 636 P. 2d 1082 at 1084

Therefore, if the applicable period is four years,

a paternity proceeding may be commenced before the child reaches
the age of 22.
If by law, in a statutory paternity proceeding, the statute
of limitations is tolled until the child reaches the age of
majority, a party should not be allowed to circumvent such a law
by asserting that the suit should be barred on equitable grounds
after only 13 years.
This

is

much

legal

authority

across

the

country

that

supports that laches should never apply to a statutory cause of
action.
Appeals

However, the State only
rule

that

laches

in

not

asking that the Court of
available

in

proceeding commenced while the child is a minor.

a

paternity

Such a ruling

would be congruent with and based upon the same reasoning as was
applied to the tolling of the statute of limitations in paternity
actions.
Finally, laches should never be applied to bar the state
from enforcing public welfare laws.

The Supreme Court of Oregon

summed this principle best ruling,
By the great weight of authority in this country the defense
of laches in not available against the government, state or
national, in a suit by it to enforce a public right or
protect a public interest....
Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co v. State Land Board, 439 P.2d 575 at
581 (OR 1967).

See also Big Piney Oil & Gas v. Wyoming Oil &

Gas, 715 P.2d 557 at 560 (WY 1986) and Arizona Law Enforcement
Merit System v. Dann, 652 P.2d 168 at 172 (Ariz. App. 1982).

Because it is the policy of this state, supported by state
law and federal regulations, to collect support from putative
fathers and because such collection help to reduce the tax burden
of Utah citizens, laches should never bar a claim brought by the
State

to

obtain

reimbursement

of

public

assistance

monies

expended and to collect child support for a custodial parent.

CONCLUSION
Appellant failed to show the nonexistence* of issues of
material

facts

necessary

to support

his

claim

for laches.

Further, appellant failed to properly allege facts necessary to
support

an

affirmative defense.

clearly was well within
appellant/defendant's

Therefore, the trial court

his discretionary

motion

for

summary

powers by denying

judgment

based

upon

laches.
In addition to the facts of this particular case, laches
should never apply to any paternity proceeding commenced while
the subject child is a minor.
child

and

society

that

are

Department of Social Services.

If laches prevails, it is the
harmed,

not

the

mother

or

the

The same reasons underlying the

tolling of the statute of limitations in a paternity proceeding
are applicable to a claim for laches.

WHEREFORE! Respondent/plaintiff respectfully asks this court
to uphold the lower courts denial of Appellant/defendant's motion
for summary judgment and further asks this court to rule that
laches is not available in a paternity proceeding commenced when
the subject child is a minor.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 2nd day January, 1990.
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